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Success  a nd Fa i lure  o f  Nor th K orean Devel opment  St r a tegy  
Nakagawa  Masahi ko  
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Dur ing the la s t decade o f  the  20 t h  cent ury,  t he  Nor t h Korean people  faced ser i ous  
economi c cr i ses ,  i ncl udi ng food and energy s hor tages .  Al t hough the food and energ y  
s i tua t i on ha s  i mpr oved s i nce tha t  t i me,  t he  s t anda rd of  l i vi ng r ema i ns  l ow.  In 2014 ,  
the  GDP per  capi ta  of  t he  Democra t ic  Peopl e ’s  Republ ic  of  K orea  was  1 ,053  do l la r s  
in off ic ia l  s ta t i s t ics—l ess  than M yanmar ’s  GPP of  1 ,270  US dol la r s  or  Bangla des h’s  
GDP of  1 ,115  US dol la r s in the  sa me year. 1  
Dur ing t he C ol d War  era ,  by con t r a s t ,  idea l i s t ic  economis ts  gave t he  DPRK economy  
hi gh r a t ings .  The na t ion was  pra ised for  i t s  r emarkab le  i ndus t r ia l iza t ion an d  
i mproved s tanda rd o f  l i vi ng,  fol l owi ng  t he  Korean War  (1950–1953) .  C ommenta t or s  
argued t ha t  t he  DPRK’s  economi c deve lopment  s t r a tegy,  whi ch pr i or i t iz ed  
inves t ment  i n heavy i ndus t r ies ,  was  a  successfu l  model  o f  s e l f- r e l iance  (Robi ns on  
1965;  Nishi kawa  1976) .  
The r egi me has  ins is t ed tha t  i t s  cur r ent  economic s tagna t i on ha s  been ca used by US  
pol ic ies  t ha t  i s ola te  t he  DPRK and phys ica l  disa s ter s ,  s uch a s  f l oods .  Idea l i s t i c  
economi s ts  have r ema i ned s i lent  about  t he  economic s i t ua t ion i n t he  DPRK s ince the  
1990s .  However,  i t  i s  unfa i r  to i gnore  inconveni ent  phenomena  or  to l i mi t  the  cause s  
of  a  prob lem t o ex ter na l  fa ctor s .  The present  s tudy a i ms  t o c la r i fy t he  cha racter i s t ic s  
of  t he  DPRK deve lopment  s t ra tegy,  exa mi n ing how the sel f- r e l iant  devel opment  
s t ra tegy r es ul t ed i n economic di ff icul t i es .  
 
The  se l f- re l ia nt  deve lopme nt  s trategy  
Many devel opi ng count r ies  in t he ea r ly s tages  of  i ndus t r ia l iz a t ion have concent r a ted  
the i r  inves t ments  in t he  l ight - i ndus t ry sector.  This  approach a i ms  t o r eplace  
i mpor ted cons umer  goods  wi t h domes t ic  products .  The DPRK devel opment  s t r a teg y  
s tands  i n cont r a s t  to t his  appr oach beca us e i t  concen t r a ted inves t ments  i n the  
hea vy- i ndus t ry sect or,  which suppl i ed machi ner y,  raw ma t er ia l s ,  and power,  ra ther  
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than t he  l i ght - indus t ry s ect or,  whi ch suppl i ed  cons umer  goods .  
The DPRK economi c devel opment  s t r a tegy  was  known a s  “ the bu i l di ng of  a n  
independent ,  na t i ona l  economy”  (Charip jok  min jok  kyongje  konso l  in Korean) .  I t  
cons is t ed o f  t he  fol l owing ob ject i ves :  
1)  To b ui l d up the  count ry us i ng domes t i c  labor  and na t i ona l  r esources ;  
2)  To pr ior i t iz e  t he  devel opment  o f  heavy i ndus t ry ;  
3)  To deve lop t he  economy i n a  di ver s i f ied way;  
4)  To eq ui p t he  economy wi t h up- to- da te  te chnol ogy;  
5)  To ob ta in goods  i n s hor t  s uppl y a nd  t hos e  unab le  t o be produced a t  home  (Hong  
Sung Un 1984) .  
Nor th Korea ’s  s t ra tegic  a i m was  t o b ui l d a  sel f- s uff ic ient  e conomy,  pr i or i t iz in g  
inves t ment  i n t he  heavy- indus t ry s ect or  s o t ha t  i t  coul d s upply power,  ma chi ner y,  
ma ter ia l s ,  and a r t i f i c ia l  ma nure t o t he  l i ght - indus t r y and agr icul t ure  s ect or s .  
Products  t ha t  were  i ndis pensab le  or  in hi gh dema nd woul d be pr oduced domes t i ca l ly.  
Forei gn t r ade would pla y a  seconda ry ro le :  us ed t o i mpor t  t hi ngs  for  which t here  was  
l i t t le  dema nd,  i tems  i n s hor t  suppl y,  a nd  those  t ha t  coul d no t  be  produce d  
domes t i ca l l y.  Onl y pr oducts  t ha t  were  s ur pl us  t o domes t ic  dema nd woul d be  
expor ted.  
In N ovember  1970 ,  Ki m I l  S ung,  t he  Supreme Lea der,  decla r ed t ha t  t he  count ry ha d  
been t r ansfor med i nt o “a  soc ia l i s t  indus t r ia l  s ta te .”  In 1978 ,  the  government  
announced t ha t  i t  had expor ted more t han ha l f  a  mi l l i on tons  o f  r ice  and tens  o f  
thousands  o f  tons  o f  ma ize to approx i ma tel y 20 count r ies  (Fore ign  Trade  1978) .  On  
Janua ry 18 ,  1983 ,  the  DPRK Centr a l  Bureau of  Sta t i s t ics  announced,  t hrough th e  
Korean Cent r a l  News Agency,  t ha t  t he  count ry was  98  percent  se l f- s uff ic ient  i n  
ma chi nery  pr oduct i on and 70  percent  se l f - suff ic i ent  i n t he  pr oduct i on of  r aw 
ma ter ia l s  and fuels .  
As  soon a s  the  r eg i me pr oudl y made publ i c  the  frui t s  of  i t s  s ocia l i s t  i ndus t r ia l iz a t ion ,  
the  DPRK’s  forei gn  deb t  pr ob lem ca me t o l ight ,  r evea l ing tha t  the  devel opment  




Negat ive  aspect s  o f  se l f- re l ia nt  deve lopment  
The s t r a tegy t o cons t ruct  a  se l f- suff i c ient  economy nega t i vel y a ffec ted t he  DPRK’s  
inves t ment  capi ta l ,  pr oduct i on cos ts ,  and t rade ba lance.  Fi r s t ,  heavy i ndus t r ies  
genera l l y r equi r e  hi gher  levels  o f  i nves t ment  than l i ght  i ndus t r ies .  In a  count ry wi t h  
no domes t ic  source of  funds ,  such a s  a  r ich agr icul t ura l  sector,  f unds  had t o be r a ised  
from abroad t o advance preferen t ia l  inves t ment  i n heavy i ndus t r ies .  
Second,  i mpor t i ng goods  i n s hor t  s uppl y  and i tems  t ha t  cannot  be produced  
domes t i ca l ly r eq ui r es  a  subs tant ia l  a mount  o f  forei gn cur r ency.  This  cur r ency ca n  
onl y be ob ta i ned b y ex por t i ng  pr oducts  t ha t  a r e  surpl us  t o domes t ic  dema nd ,  
produced cheapl y enough t o be sol d for  p rofi t  i n the  int erna t i ona l  ma rket .  As  
indus t r ia l iza t ion progresses ,  t he  i mpor ta t ion of  ma t er ia l s  no t  ava i lab le  a t  home  
tends  t o increa se .  At  the  sa me t i me,  i nves t ment  i n t he  ex por t  i ndus t ry decrea se s  
because  domes t ic  i ndus t r ies  come  f i r s t .  In  t hi s  s i tua t i on,  a  l i mi ted a mount  of  forei gn  
cur r ency i s  ob ta ined.  
Thi rd,  dependence on l oca l  raw ma t er ia l s  and te chniq ues  l i mi ts  t he  ways  i n whi ch  
cheap r aw ma ter ia l s  and i nter media te  goods  can be suppl i ed by i nt erna t i ona l  ma rkets ,  
caus i ng a  r i se  in product ion cos ts .  W hen heavy- indus t r y pr oduct i on cos ts  r i se ,  cos t s  
a l so r i se  i n  l i ght  i ndus t r ies  and agr icul ture ,  which us e  energy,  ma ter ia l s ,  ma chi ner y,  
and chemi ca l  fer t i l iz er  produced by heavy i ndus t r ies .  I f  the  r i s ing pr oduct i on cos ts  
ar e  not  o ffset  by t he  government  to ma t ch pr oduct  pr ices ,  t he  out put  of  products  i n  
a l l  economi c sect or s ,  i ncl udi ng da i ly necess i t ies  and food,  wi l l  decrea se.  
 
Soc ia l i st  i nd ustr ia l izat io n a nd external  fundi ng  
Under  J apanes e rule ,  ma ny i ndus t r ia l  fa ci l i t i es  were  b ui l t  i n N or th K orea ,  incl udi n g  
the chemica l  f er t i l iz er  fa ctor y in Hungna m (Hungna m Fer t i l iz er  Complex  t oda y) ,  
power  pla nts  on t he  Amnok,  P uj on,  Hochon,  Changj in,  Tokro,  a nd  S odus u Ri ver s ,  
and the i r on  wor ks  i n Kenj i ho (Hwanghae Ir on C ompl ex  t oday) .  In addi t i on,  severa l  
coa l  and ore  mi nes  were es tab l i s hed i n  t he  nor thern pa r t  o f  t he  Korean Peni ns ula .  
These gave t he  DPRK an ini t ia l  se t  of  condi t ions  tha t  was  more advantageous  t ha n  
those o f  ma ny newl y r i s ing na t i ons .  Af ter  l ibera t i on on Augus t  15 ,  1945 ,  1 ,034  
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ent erpr i ses  were  na t iona l iz ed.  Thei r  pr oper t y va lue a mount ed  t o 4  b i l l ion  and 431  
mi l l ion won,  four  t i mes  t he  na t iona l  budget  of  1  b i l l ion,  116  mi l l i on won for  FY 
1946  (Otnoshen i ia  Sove tskogo  1981,  25–27;  J os onj unga ngtongs i nsa  1949 ,  117) .  
Apa r t  f rom 19  power  plan ts ,  t he  ent erpr i s es  taken  over  b y N or th  Korea  were  
inact i ve:  64  coa l  and ore  mi nes  were ful ly f l ooded;  178  coa l  and ore  mi nes  wer e  
pa r t ia l l y s ub merged or  des t royed ;  i mpor ta nt  equi pment  and faci l i t ies  were  da maged  
a t 47 enterpr i s es .  Not  onl y di d Nor t h Korea r es t ore  the  de s t royed fact or ies  and  
f l ooded mi nes ,  t he  S oviet  Ar my,  whi ch occupied t he  nor t her n ha l f  of  K orea ,  
del ivered s uppl ies  and eng ineer s  t o a ss i s t  i n t he  na t i on’s  indus t r ia l  r ehab i l i ta t io n  
(Ki m I l  S ung 1948 ,  189–190;  Otnoshen i ia  Sove tskogo  1981 ,  16–17) .  
The government  announced i t s  Two-Yea r  Economic Pla n (1949–1950)  on F ebrua ry 1 ,  
1949  and entered i nt o  an a greement  t o r ece ive  f i na ncia l  s uppor t  f r om t he  S ovie t  
Union on March 17 t h .  The S ovi et  Uni on agreed t o l oan t he DPRK 222  mi l l i on rub le s  
over  t hree  yea r s ,  whi l e  t he  DPRK agreed t o r epay t his  su m a t  2  percent  annua l  
int er es t .  Dur ing t ha t  yea r,  the  S oviet  l oan p layed a  la rge  rol e  enab l i ng the  DPRK t o  
r es tore  and  ex pand i ndus t r ia l  fa ci l i t ies ,  i ncl udi ng t he  Kangs on Steel  Plant  (C hol l i ma  
Stee l  C omplex) ,  t he  S ongj i n Steel  Plant  ( now t he S ongj in  St eel  C omplex) ,  t he  
Munpyong S me l t i ng Fact ory,  C hongj i n Steel  Plant  (Ki m C haek St eel  and Iro n  
Complex  t oday) ,  Na mpho Gla ss  Factor y,  P yongya ng Machine Product i on Fact or y  
(Hui chon-Ryonha  Machi ne Tools  Genera l  Factor y t oda y) ,  Pyongya ng Text i le  Mi l l ,  
and S uphung Hydroelec t r ic  P ower  Sta t ion,  dur ing t ha t  yea r.   
Dur ing the Korean War  (1950–1953) ,  the  P eopl e’s Republ ic  o f  C hi na ,  a s wel l  a s  
Pola nd,  Czechos l ovakia ,  R oma nia ,  Hunga ry,  t he  Ger ma n Democra t ic  Republ ic ,  
Bul ga r ia ,  Albania ,  Mongol ia ,  and t he  P eopl e’s  Republ ic  of  Viet na m j oi ned the US S R  
in a ss is t i ng t he  DPRK b y sendi ng a id s uch a s  tex t i l es ,  c l ot hi ng,  food,  an d  
pha r maceut ica l  pr oducts .  Thanks  t o t his  a id,  the  government  was  ab le  to move i nlan d  
and t o ex pand machi ne plan ts ,  in con junct i on  wi t h muni t i on pr oduct i on.  
Aft er  the  wa r,  f r iendl y count r ies  s ent  s i gni f icant  f r ee  economic  a id t o  t he  DPRK.  
Ki m I l  S ung urged the a l l ied leader s  to a ss i s t  in cons t r uct i ng i ndus t r ia l  fa ci l i t i es  t o  
produce ma chi ner y,  r aw ma ter ia l s ,  and energy,  r a ther  t han pr ov id ing the food an d  
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c lo th ing a i d tha t  Nor t h Koreans  longed fo r.  As  the  Three-Yea r  Economi c Pla n  
(1953–1956) and Fi ve-Yea r  Economi c Plan (1957–1961)  were ca rr ied out ,  Rodong  
S inmun,  the  da i l y o f  Wor ker s ’ Par ty of  K orea,  announced tha t  grants  f rom fr iendl y  
count r ies  t ota led 500  mi l l i on rub les  ( new) ,  equi va lent  t o b ot h 550  mi l l ion dol la r s  
(Rodong S inmun  1963)  and approx i ma tel y 2 , 220 mi l l i on rub les  (ol d) ,  a s  they were  
pr iced before  t he  r edeno mi na t ion of  1961 . This  a mount  seems modera te  because ,  
a ccord ing  t o t he  la ter  ca lcula t i on of  S ovie t  e conomis ts ,  t he  to ta l  um of  t hos e grant s  
was  800  mi l l i on rub les  ( new)  from 1953  to 1 957 (Kore iska ia  narodno  1975 ,  50) .   
The US SR hel ped t o r es tore  or  bui l d 20  economic proj ects ,  i ncl udi ng t he S uphun g  
Hydr oel ect r ic  P ower  Sta t i on,  Hungna m C hemi ca l  Factor y (Hungna m Fer t i l iz er  
Complex  t oday) ,  K i m Chaek St eel  Pla nt  (Ki m Chaek Steel  and Ir on Compl ex  today) ,  
Na mpho Non- fer rous  Meta l l urgi ca l  Works  (Na mpho S me l ter  C omplex ,  c l osed i n  
2000) ,  Pyongya ng Text i le  Mi l l ,  Madong  Februa ry 8  Cement  Plant ,  Si nph o  
Fish-Canni ng Fact or y,  Ryongs ong Mea t  Process i ng Plant ,  K i l j u P lywood Fact ory,  
Sar iwon Tractor  Repa i r  Shop (Sa r iwon Tr actor  Access ory Factor y t oday) ,  and  
Pyongyang Radi o Sta t i on.  The GDR commit ted i t s e l f  t o cons t ruct i ng the  P ukjun g  
Machi ne Plant ,  which pr oduced diese l  engi nes  (Pukj ung Machine C omplex  toda y) ,  
the  P yongya ng Pr int i ng Genera l  Factor y,  Pyongyang Text i l e  Machi ne  Fact ory,  
Ha mhung E lect r ic  Appl iances  Pla nt  (Ha mhung Yout h E lect r ic  Appl iances  Plan t  or  
J une 1s t  Fact ory t oda y) ,  Hungsang Cera mi c Factor y,  and l oca l  i ndus t r ia l fa ci l i t i es .  
Czechos l ovakia  hel ped t o cons t ruct  the  Hui chon Machi ne-Tool  Works ,  Unsan Tool  
Plant  (or  J ul y 13 th Fact ory) ,  Tokchon Mot or  Plant  (S ungr i  Motor  C omplex  today) ,  
and hydroelect r ic  plants  on t he  P uj on and Hochon Ri ver s .  Hunga ry s uppor ted t he  
bui l di ng of  t he  Kus ong Machine-Tool  Works  (or  Apr i l  3 r d Fact ory) ,  P onggun g  
Dye-St uff  Fact or y,  and Pyongyang Measur ing Ins t ruments  Fact or y.  P olan d  
commi t ted i t s e l f  t o b ui l di ng l ocomot i ve- r epa i r  plants  i n Wonsa n and Wes t  
Pyongyang ( theWonsan Ra i lwa y R ol l i ng St ock C omplex  and Ki m J ong Tae E lect r i c  
Locomot i ve C omplex  t oda y) ;  i t  a l so r es t ored coa l  mi nes  a t  Anju and Si nchang .  
Roma nia  hel ped  t o cons t ruct  t he  S unghor i  Cement  Fact ory and t he S unchon As pi r i n  
Factor y (Sunchon P ha r maceut i ca l  Factory t oda y) .  Bul ga r ia  suppor ted th e  
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cons t r uct i on of  t he  Taes ong Ti le  Fact ory  (Taesong Cera mic Fact or y t oday) ,  
Pyongyang Wooden-Bar rel  Fact ory  ( la ter  merged wi t h t he  P yongyang Wood 
Process i ng Fact or y) ,  and Kanggye Wood Process ing Fact or y.  The PRC ga thered labor  
and ma t er ia l  suppor t  t o he lp r epa i r  the  S uphung Hydr oelect r ic  P ower  Sta t ion ,  
cons t r uct  t he  P yongyang Rubb er  Factory and Si nui j u Ena meled Ironware Fact ory,  
and ex pand t he faci l i t ies  of  the  Wonsan Irons mi t h C oopera t ive.  This  f r ee  economi c  
ass is tance pla yed a  crucia l  role  i n t he  ea r ly success  of  b ot h economic plans ,  a s  Nor t h  
Korean schola r s  r ecognized a t  t he  t i me  (Uri  narawi  1958 ,  292 ,  355) .   
Aft er  t he  pos t -wa r  r ehab i l i ta t i on,  a  Seven- Yea r  Economic Plan (1961–1967)  was  
devis ed.  I t  was  t hen deci ded to pro long t he pl an by t hree  yea r s .  Al t hough the r eg i me  
cla i med t ha t  the  delay was  caused b y s t r engt hened mi l i ta ry cons t r uct i on,  i t  shoul d be  
noted  t ha t  the  expect ed S ovi et  a i d package  was  not  i mpl emented  i n t he  ea r ly  1960s .  
The DPRK and US SR agreed t ha t  t he  USSR woul d pr ovi de i ndus t r ia l  fa ci l i t i es ,  to b e  
pa id for  by t he  DPRK.  However,  t he pro ject s  announced i n t he  agreements  o f  March  
17 ,  1959 ,  Decemb er  24 ,  1960 ,  and J une  6 ,  1963 ,  a s  wel l  a s  t he  Augus t  5 t h  pr ot ocol  i n  
1963 ,  were  not  ful ly ca rr ied out  (Otnoshen i ia  Sove tskogo  1981 ,  169–172 ,  240–245) .   
Sovi et  a id r es tar ted dur i ng the  la te  1960s .  On J une 20 ,  1966 , the  US SR pr omised t o  
coopera te  i n expa nding t he Ki m C haek Ir onwor ks ,  bui l di ng t he P ukchang Ther ma l  
Power  Sta t i on (a  crude- oi l  process i ng fac tory) ,  and cons t ruct i ng an a mmonia  
produc t i on  fact ory.  On Oct ober  21 ,  1967 ,  i t  a l so pr omised t o hel p cons t ruc t  
coa l - min ing faci l i t i es ,  an e lect r ic  ma chi ne-pr oduct i on plant ,  and a  ra i l road-ca r r iage  
factor y (Otnoshen i ia  Sove tskogo  1981 ,  240–245,  282 :  Rodong  S inmun  1966) .  The  
f i r s t  s tage o f  cons t ruct i on of  t he  P ukchang Power  Sta t i on was  comple ted i n 1970 .  
The Unggi  Oi l  R efi nery Plant  (S ungr i  C hemi ca l  Complex  toda y)  began opera t ions  i n  
1973 ,  whi l e  t he  coa l  f ie ld  a t  the  Yonghung Yout h C oa l  Mi ne (Kumya  Yout h C oa l  
Mine t oday)  was  bui l t  a t  t he  end of  t he  1960s .  However,  ot her  pr ojects  were  e i t her  
cance led or  no t  compl eted wi t hi n the  per iod of  t he  pr ol onged Seven-Year  Pla n  
(1961–1970) .  
Dur ing t he 1960s ,  Chi nes e a id began t o pla y a  la rger  rol e  tha n before .  The DPRK and  
PRC s i gned con t racts  r e la ted to  l oans  and  fr ee  a id  t o b ui l d economi c faci l i t i es  on  
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September  27 ,  1958 ,  Oct ober  13 ,  1960 ,  March  28 , 1961 ,  and Decemb er  28 ,  1965 .  The  
amount  was  not  announced,  except  t ha t  the  loan ment i oned in t he  agree ment  o f  
October  13 ,  1960  was  wor t h 420  mi l l ion r ub l es .   
Thanks  to C hi nese a ss is tance,  t he  Hyesan P aper  Mi l l s  began opera t ions  i n 1963 ,  
fo l l owed b y t he S inui ju Tex t i le  Mi l l  pr in t i ng  shop a nd the  Hoeryong S uga r  Fact or y  
in 1964 . A radi o communica t i on eq ui pment  fact ory opened i n 1965; the  Manph o  
Ther ma l  P ower  Sta t i on,  Unb ong  Hydroelect r ic  P ower  Sta t i on,  and Ha mhung Wool  
Mi l l s  opened i n 1967 .  The Kanggye Kni t t i ng Mil l ,  Huichon Ther ma l  P ower  Sta t i on,  
and Amnokgang Ti r e  Fact ory opened in  1968 ,  whi l e  t he  H uichon E lect r ic  Tub e  
Factor y (Huichon Yout h E lec t r ic i t y C omplex  today)  opened i n 1969 .  A r adi o-pa r t s  
fa ctor y and a  r adi o-appara tus  fact ory opened  i n 1970;  t he  Ryangchaek Bea r in g  
Factor y (or  Oct ober  30 th Factor y)  opened i n 1975 (Rodong S inmun  1959;  
Dangdaizhongguode  d ianz igongye  1987 ,  656–659;  Dangdaizhongguode  
fangzh igongye  1994 ,  561 ;  Dangdaizhongguode  du i wai j ing j ihe zuo  1989,  52 ,  177 ,  180 ,  
186) .  
Al t hough i t  i s  unclea r  how much S oviet  and Chi nes e a id t he  DPRK recei ved dur i ng  
the 1960s ,  t hes e  cont r ibut ions  c lea r ly hel ped t o compl ete  t he  pr ocess  of  s oc ia l i s t  
indus t r ia l iza t ion,  for mi ng t he na t ion’s  sel f- s uppor t ing economi c s t ruct ure .  
 
Debt  i ssues  
Before  t he  DPRK’s  unpa i d deb ts  to West ern count r ies  and Japan emerged in t he  
1970s ,  t he count r y was  i n deb t  t o t he US SR .  On Oct ober  13 ,  1960 ,  the  DPRK and  
USSR  agreed tha t  t he  USSR  woul d cancel  760  mi l l i on rub l es  wor t h o f  pa s t  deb ts ;  t he  
DPRK woul d pay back the r ema i ni ng 140  mi l l ion rub les  t o t he  USSR over  10  yea r s ,  
s tar t ing i n 1967 .  The r epayment  s ta r t  da te  was  changed i n 1971  and t he per i od was  
ex tended for  14  yea r s  under  an a greement  ma de on J une 20 ,  1966  
(J osonj ungangt ongs i nsa  1962 ,  135–136; Otnoshen i ia  Sove tskogo  1981 ,  240–245) .  
The s ta r t  da te  was  changed aga in i n 1976 , when t he per iod was  ex tended for  anot her  
5  yea r s .  The S oviet  Union a ls o pos t poned t he r epayment  s ta r t  da te  for  the  l oan ,  
which b y t hen to ta led  400  mi l l i on rub l es .  I n  1981 ,  the  per iod was  ex tended b y 1 0  
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yea r s  via  an agreement  ma de on F ebrua ry 9 ,  1976  (Otnoshen i ia  Sove tskogo  1981 ,  
343–348).   
Not  onl y di d t he  S ovie t  Uni on defer  the  DP RK’s  deb t  r epayment ,  i t  a l s o gave t he  
count r y a  new loa n.  The S eptemb er  15 ,  1970  agreement  between the DPRK and t he  
USSR s ta ted tha t  the  USS R would hel p t o fund the cons t ruct ion of  plants  t o produce  
car  ba t ter ies ,  ena me led wires ,  micr omotor s ,  car r iages ,  ca rb ides ,  a nd gray s la g.  The  
loan a mount  a ssoc ia ted wi t h th is  agreement  i s  no t  c lea r,  even today.  B y cont r a s t ,  the  
loan  a mount  agreed  on F ebrua ry 9 ,  1976  had been a l r eady  announced.  Accordi ng t o  
this  agreement ,  t he  Sovi et  Union would pr ov ide t he  DPRK wi t h 117  mi l l i on rub l es  
wor t h of  cr edi t  t o ex pand t he Ki m C haek Ir onwor ks  and t o cons t r uct  t he  C hongj i n  
Ther ma l  P ower  Sta t i on,  a  bea r ing p lant ,  an ammonia  plan t ,  and a n a lumi ni um plan t  
(Otnoshen i ia  Sove tskogo  1981 ,  279–283 ,  343–348) .   
Of the  pr ojects  na med in these  agreements ,  t he  Taedonggang Ca r  Ba t tery Pla nt  bega n  
opera t ions  i n 1981;  t he  ena mel ed wire  s hop a t  the  P yongyang E l ect r ic  Cable  Factor y  
(or  March 26 th Fact ory)  in 1979;  the  P yongya ng E lect r ic  Appl i ca t ion Fact ory,  whi c h  
produced micromot or s ,  i n 1986;  the  C hongj i n Ther ma l  P ower  Sta t ion i n 1986;  the  
Ryongs ong B ea r ing Factor y (or  Septemb er  18 th Fact ory)  in 1986;  the  a mmonia  
produc t i on s hop a t  the  J une 7 th Fact or y ( former l y Aoj i  Chemica l  Fact ory)  i n 1982;  
and t he P ukchang Al umi ni um Fact ory i n 1985 .   
Chi na  a lso  o ffer ed a i d dur ing  t he  1970s .  The  DPRK concl uded economi c coopera t ion  
agreements  wi t h t he  PRC on Oct ober  17 ,  1970;  on Augus t  15 ,  1971;  on Oct ob er  9 ,  
1972;  on J une 18 ,  1973;  and on Augus t  30 ,  1 974.  Sar iwon Text i le  Mi l l s  launched in 
1974 ,  and the Chongchongang Ther ma l  E lect r ic  Sta t ion began ful l  opera t ions  in 1978 .  
A super  hi gh fr eq uency t ube plan t  began oper a t ions  i n 1978  and a n a r t i f ic ia l  cr ys ta l  
fa ci l i t y launched i n 197 . O ther  new factor ies  incl uded t he pump s ub- fact ory o f  t he  
Huichon Prec is i on  Machi nery Fact or y (or  Februa ry 26  Fact or y)  in 1980;  t he  
Ponghwa  Chemica l  Factor y,  which r ef i ned oi l ,  i n 1981; the  Chongchongang  
Chemi ca l  Fact ory (Anj u Ins ula t i ng Ma ter ia l  Factor y t oday) ;  a  r adi o i ns t rument  
factor y i n 1982;  and a  dry cel l  fa ctor y i n 1984.  The N o.  8  Ironwor ks  launched i n  
1986 ,  whi l e  t he  S unchon Ther ma l  E lect r i c  Sta t ion b egan ful l  opera t ions  i n 1988  
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(Dangdaizhongguode  du i wai j ing j ihe zuo  1989 ,  157 ,  177 , 180 ,  189 ;  
Dangdaizhongguode  d ianz igongye  1987,  666–667 ,  671 , 674 ;  Dangdaizhongguode  
d ian l igongye  1994 ,  510) .  Al though nei t her  the  s ta tus  of  t he  P RC loa n nor  the  
DPRK’s  r epayment  s i t ua t i on were ever  announced,  con t i nu ing pro jec ts ,  ca rr ied ou t  
wi t h C hi nese he lp,  s how t ha t  C hi na ,  a s  wel l  a s  the  S oviet  Uni on,  r efr a ined fro m 
press ur ing t he DPRK t o r eplay i t s  l oans .   
In  cont r a s t  to  t his  Sovi et  and  C hi nes e gener os i t y,  capi ta l i s t  count r i es  s t r ic t l y  
enforced t he  r epayment  o f  l oans .   
The DPRK bega n negot ia t i ng  wi th  Wester n European  count r ies  t o  i mpor t  fa ct or y  
equi pment  a t  the  end of  t he  1960s ,  conduc t ing b us i ness  wi t h Western  Eur opea n  
count r ies  and J apan dur ing t he  ea r ly 1970s .  At  tha t  t i me,  t he  DPRK did not  have  
enough forei gn cur r ency to r epay capi ta l i s t  count r ies .  On Oct ober  21 ,  1974 ,  Ki m 
J ong I l ,  who ha d been na med “ the onl y s uccessor  o f  Comrade Ki m I l  S ung,”  ordered  
a l l  economi c sect or s  to conduct  a  “ Seven ty- Day Ba t t le”  t o meet  t he  na t i on’s  annua l  
goa l  of  1974  ea r ly,  i ncl udi ng i ncrea sed pr oduct i on o f  ex por t  i t ems  (Ki m J ong I l  1987 ,  
251–252).  As  a  r eward for  t his  ca mpa i gn,  t he  Six -Year  Economi c Pla n was  
compl eted one yea r  and four  mont hs  ea r ly,  in 1975 . However,  t he  i nter na t iona l  
pr ices  o f  nonfer rous  meta ls ,  t he  DPRK’s ma in expor t  i tem,  pl ummeted i n t he  
a f ter ma th o f  t he  oi l  cr i s i s  of  1973 .  For  t his  r ea son,  t he  DPRK could not  a cqu i r e  
suff i c ient  forei gn cur r ency t o r epay t he capi t a l i s t  s ta tes  i t  had b or rowed from.   
In  1975 ,  the  DPRK’s  outs ta nd ing  l oans  b eca me a  pr ob lem for  11  count r i es ,  i ncl udi n g  
Japan,  France,  t he  F edera l  Republ ic  o f  Ger many,  and S weden.  The a mount  owed  t o  
thes e  count r ies  t ota led 1  b i l l ion 242  mi l l ion  dol la r s .  The f i r s t  cr edi t or  was  Japan ,  
sa id t o ha ve lent  Nor t h Korea  386  mi l l i on  dol la r s by the  end of  1975  ( Yomiur i  
Sh imbun  1975;  Herald  Tr ibune  1975;  Sanke i  Sh imbun  1976) .   
The Nor t h Korean r e gi me emphas ized i t s  i ncr ea sed product ion o f  nonfer rous  meta ls  
and ex pl oi ta t i on of  new ex por t  i t ems .  On J ul y 1 ,  1976 , Ki m J ong I l  vis i t ed t he  
Komdok Mi ne (Komdok Mi ni ng C omplex  t oday) ,  the  la rges t  producer  of  l ead and  
z inc on t he Korean peni ns ula .  He di r ected  the  worker s  there  t o ea rn “ forei g n  
cur r ency of  hundreds  of  mi l l i ons  o f  pounds for  one yea r”  (Ki m J ong I l  1987 ,  
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360–361).  On December  1s t ,  t he  worker s  o f  Komdok la unched a  pr oduct i on upl i f t  
ca mpa ign,  known a s  the  “ Three-Revol ut i on  Red Flag M ovement ,”  whi ch sprea d  
across  t he  whole  count r y.  On J ul y 15 ,   K i m I l  Sung i ns t ructed t he  o ff i c ia l s  in cha rge  
to organize  t he  Unha  Tradi ng Genera l  Bureau,  a  corpora te  group,  s pec ia l iz ed i n  
produc ing and ex por t i ng l i ght  i ndus t r ia l  products .  Dur i ng a  mee t i ng be tween t he  
Worker ’s  Par ty  and t he gover nment ,  hel d be tween  Novemb er  30  and December  6 ,  
K i m I l  Sung ins t ruc ted every  provi ncia l  gove rnment  t o  es tab l i s h t r ade  compa ni es  t o  
expl oi t  expor t  goods  i n l oca l  manufact ur ing  (Ki m I l  S ung 2005 ,  384–385) .  At  t he  
19 t h  p lena ry meet i ng of  t he  5 t h  WPK Cent r a l  Commit t ee ,  hel d on December  12 ,  1979 ,  
he  ordered ever y cent r a l  gover nment  mi nis t ry and commit tee  t o organ ize  i t s  ow n 
t rade compa ny (Ki m I l  Sung 1988 ,  453) .  
The meas ures  ta ken b y t he t wo pol i t i ca l  leade r s  appea red t o work.  The DPRK repa i d  
the  in ter es t  on i t s  ex ter na l  deb ts  f rom 197 9  unt i l  1984 .  The Second Seven-Year  
Economic Pla n (1978–1984) ,  des i gned t o p roduce 2 .2  t i mes  t he  t ota l  indus t r ia l  
out put ,  was  announced t o have been success ful .  However,  gi ven i t s  dec l i ni ng  
credib i l i t y wi th  capi ta l i s t  count r ies ,  t he  D PRK had no choi ce b ut  to depend on  
socia l i s t  count r ies  for  ex terna l  e conomi c r e la t ions .   
 
Copi ng  to  the  s hor tage  of  co ns umer goods 
Since t he  DPRK inves t ed mor e heavi l y in produci ng capi ta l  tha n cons umer  goods ,  
the  Nor t h Korea n people  na t ura l ly exper ienced a  s hor tage o f  goods ,  a s  
indus t r ia l iza t ion proceeded.  The pol i t i ca l  leader sh ip under s t ood tha t  t he  la ck of  
cons umer  goods  and food ma de i t  di ff i cu l t  to ca l l  the  DPRK was  “ the pa radise  of  t he  
peopl e ,”  even t hough publ i c  dissa t i s fact i on wi th l iv ing  condi t i ons  was  not  express ed  
in t he  for m of  s t r ikes  or  prot es t  movements .  I n the  ea r ly 1980s ,  the  Po l i s h cr i s i s  
s t i mula ted t he  r egi me  t o take meas ures  t o i mprove the  qua l i t y o f  l i f e  i n t he  DPRK.  
Pola nd,  l i ke  t he  DPRK,  a lso owed  money t o capi ta l i s t  count r ies  i n t he  1970s .  A r i s e  
in edib le  mea t  pr ices  on J ul y  1 ,  1980  t r iggered a  la rge- sca le  s t r i ke  i n  Gdans k ,  
provoki ng a  procla ma t i on of  mar t ia l  law on December  13 ,  1981.  The Worker ’s  Pa r ty  
of  Korea  r e lea sed an a r t ic l e  i n t he  pa r ty  newspaper  on J anua ry 6 ,  1982 ,  s uppor t i n g  
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the  dec la ra t ion of  mar t ia l  law and cr i t ic iz i ng “ Sol i da r i ty,”  t he  labor  uni on lea di ng  
the s t r i ke ,  a s a  count er r evol ut i ona ry e lement  (Rodong  S inmun 1982) .  The Worker ’s  
Par ty of  Korea  was  aware of  t he  danger s  o f  i mpover is hment .  K i m I l  Sung and Ki m 
J ong I l  ma de s peeches  on  i mpr ovi ng l i vi ng s tanda rds  i n 1983  (Ki m I l  S ung 1991 ,  
344–352:  Ki m J ong I l  1996 ,  400–408) .   
One meas ure  taken t o i mpr ove l iv ing s tanda rds  was  the  “ Augus t  3 r d  People’s  
Cons umer  Goods  Product ion Ca mpa ign,”  es ta b l i shed  on the i ns t r uct i ons  o f  Ki m J ong  
I l  on Augus t  3 ,  1984 .  This  ca mpa i gn s e t  up organiza t ions  known a s  “ home  
wor ktea ms,”  “ s idel i ne  wor ktea ms,”  and “ home  wel fa re  ser vice  col umns ,”  to ma ke  
produc ts  f r om fact ory b yproduc ts  and scraps .  On J une 23 ,  1990 ,  i t  was  announce d  
tha t  t he  pr oduct i on o f  “ Augus t  3 r d  cons umer  goods”  had  i ncrea sed 3 .4  t i mes ,  whi l e  
produc t  va r ie t y ha d i ncrea sed to 10 ,000  di ffe r ent  ki nds  o f  pr oducts  over  four  yea r s  
(Yon H yong M uk.  1990) .  
Anot her  measure  t o i mpr ove l i vi ng s tanda rds  was  the  promot i on of  jo in t  vent ure s  
wi t h cap i ta l i s t  count r ies .  The r egi me expect ed t o r ecei ve a  large i nves t ment  i n i t s  
l ight - i ndus t ry sec tor  by s t epp ing up joi nt  vent ures  wi th forei gn b us i ness es .  The  
Equi t y J oi nt  Vent ure  Law was  enact ed on  Sept ember  8 ,  1984 ,  and t he DPRK  
success ful l y a t t ra cted i nves t ments  from K orean b us i ness men l i vi ng i n Japan .  
Between 1986 and 1989 ,  98  cont r acts  were  s i gned,  o f  which 48  had begun opera t ions  
by 1989 ,  to ta l ing 113  b i l l i on  yen (Pak Sa msok 1990) ,  about  790  mi l l ion  dol lar s .  
However,  nei t her  Japanese bus i ness men i n J apan nor  en t r epreneur s  in ot her  
capi ta l i s t  na t ions  s howed any i nter es t  a t  a l l .  The DPRK had a l r eady  l os t  Japan’s  
t rus t  b y s t oppi ng  i t s  i nt er es t  r epayments  t o Japan i n Novemb er  1983  and  t o ot her  
cr edi t or s  i n March 1984 .   
Al t hough t hes e  e ffor t s  to i mprove l i vi ng s ta nda rds  pa id o ff i n t he i r  own wa y,  they  
di d not  modify t he  t r adi t i ona l  pr inc ip les  o f  indus t r ia l  inves t ment .  Ins tead,  t he y  
mere ly  t r ea ted s ympt oms caus ed b y t he  DPR K economi c devel opment  s t r a tegy.  The  
Thi rd Seven-Year  Economi c Pla n (1987–1993)  was  ba sed on  preferent ia l  inves t ment  




A gro wi ng  s hor tage  of  i nvestment  funds  
Alt hough t he DPRK was  not  a  ful l  me mb er  of  t he  Counci l  f or  Mut ua l  Economi c  
Ass is tance (COMECON) ,  i t  benefi t ed from a  combi na t i on of  a  bar ter-and- t r ade  
sys tem a nd fr iendl y pr ices  a mong COMECON memb ers .  Conseq uent l y,  i t  t r ade d  
ma in ly wi t h s oc ia l i s t  count r ies .  The col laps e o f  s ocia l i s t  governments  i n Eas ter n  
Europe a nd the end of  t he  C ol d War  in  t he  l a te  1980s  led t o t he  de s t ruc t i on of  t he  
int erna t iona l  s ocia l i s t  ma r ket  sys tem.  O n J anua ry 29 ,  1990 ,  COMECON count r ies  
agreed t o conduc t  b i la ter a l  tr ade i n ha rd cur r enci es ,  r eplaci ng previ ous  ba r ter  
ar rangements  ba sed on fr iendl y pr ices .  The DPRK and t he S oviet  Uni on,  whi ch was  
the  DPRK’s la rges t  t r ading pa r tner,  s igned a  new t r ade agreement  ba sed on  
ha rd-cur r ency t rade on November  2 nd.  Economi c coopera t ion wi t h ot her  count r ies  i n  
Eas tern E urope was  sus pended dur ing t ha t  t i me.   
This  cha nge in t he  mode of  t radi ng da ma ged  the Nor th Korean economy.  Al thoug h  
the S ovi et  Uni on' s  tota l  t rade wi t h t he  DPR K was  17 .7  b i l l ion rub les  i n 1990 , i t  
pl unged t o 6 .1  b i l l i on r ub les  i n 1991 ,  a  thi rd of  t he  or i gi na l  a mount .  The DPRK’s  
tota l  deb t  t o the  USS R grew t o 2 .85 b i l l i on rub les  i n 1991 (Moi seyev 1991) ,  about  
4 .76  b i l l i on dol la r s .  The US SR s t opped crude oi l  i mpor ts  to t he  DPRK,  leadi ng t o  
r es t r ic t ions  on the  us e  o f  ga s ol i ne i n urban a rea s o f  Nor t h Korea  ( apa r t f ro m 
produc t i on  sec tor s )  on  Sa tur days  and  S unda ys ,  begi nni ng i n J une  1992 .  Thanks  t o i t s  
se l f- s uppor t i ng s t ruct ure ,  however,  the  s ocia l i s t  DPRK economy cont inued t o grow 
unt i l  1993 .  In  1992 ,  Nor th K orea’s  GDP was  20 .8  b i l l i on  do l la r s ,  r i s ing  t o 20 .9  
b i l l ion do l la r s in 1993  (UNDP 1998) .  The Thi rd Seven-Yea r  Economic Pla n the n  
ended ;  dur i ng i t s  i mpl ementa t i on,  indus t r ia l  out put  i ncrea sed 1 .5  t i mes ,  less  t han t he  
1 .9  t i mes  or i gi na l ly es t i ma t ed.  
In r es ponse t o r educed economic t ies  wi t h t he  Sovi et  Uni on and Eas tern E uropea n  
count r ies ,  t he  DPRK sought  t o expa nd comme rcia l  r e la t ions  wi t h capi ta l i s t  count r ies .  
On December  28 ,  1991 , Nor th Korea  es tab l i s hed a  Free Economic Trade Zone i n the 
Ra j in-Sonb ong Dis t r ic t ,  enab l i ng forei gn cap i ta l i s t s  to conduc t  bus i ness  a lone.  The  
government  announced t ha t  t he  FETZ cons t r uct i on pr oject  r eq ui r ed 7  b i l l i on do l la r s  
in i nves t ments  b y 2010 , o f  which 4 .2  b i l l i on dol la r s  woul d be needed to b ui l d  
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in fr a s truc ture .  B y 1994 , however,  i nves t ment  from abroad t ota led onl y 35–36  
mi l l ion dol la r s .  The economic zone was  not  a t t ra ct i ve  enough to per s uade forei gn  
capi ta l i s t s  to i gnore  the  deb t  i s s ue.  In 1994 , the  Nor th Korea n economy began t o  
shr ink:  i n 1994 ,  i t s  GDP was  15 .4  b i l l ion dol lar s  (UNDP 1998) .   
In  t he  s ummer  o f  1995 ,  t he  N or th  Korean peopl e  s uffered  mass i ve  f l ood da ma ge ,  
tota l i ng 15  b i l l i on dol la r s  (Depa r t ment  of  Huma ni ta r ian Affa i r s  1995) .  The  
sub mergence and  out f l ow of  fa r mland  and the des t ruct ion  of  a gr icul t ura l  
in fr a s truc ture  l ed to a  ser ious  fa mi ne,  dur ing which 336 ,000 peopl e  d ied o f  
s tarva t i on  (Moon Ho I l  2011) . 2  The f l oodi ng  of  coa l  mi nes  a l s o caus ed severe  energy  
shor tages .  Si nce t he  government  had to  f inance disa s ter  r e covery,  i nves t ment  i n  
hea vy i ndus t r ies ,  whi ch underp inned the DPRK’s  sel f- suppor t i ng s t r uct ure ,  was  
depl eted.  The socia l i s t  economy cont i nued to s hr ink unt i l  1996 .  In 1995 ,  Nor t h  
Korea’s  GDP was  12 .8  b i l l i on dol la r s ;  in 1996 , i t  was  10 .6  b i l l ion dol la r s  (UND P 
1998) .   
The r egi me  ca l led  on UN agenc ies  a nd  for eign  count r ies  t o  pr ovi de  emergency  
ass is tance,  whi l e  a l so mobi l iz i ng i t s  mi l i ta ry and urban and off ic e  wor ker s  to r es tor e  
the  a gr icul t ura l  and power  sect or s .   
In  t he  a gr icu l t ura l  sect or,  bet ween  1995  and 1997 ,  a  “ Rice-Plant i ng a nd  Weedi n g  
Ba t t le”  mobi l iz ed labor  forces .  D ur ing th is  per i od,  UN a genci es  o ff er ed  te chn ica l  
ass i s tance t o i mprove cul t iva t i on,  i n a ccordance  wi t h s oi l  condi t i ons ,  and t o  
int r oduce semia nnua l  double  cr ops .  In 1998 , a  “ Pota to Revol ut i on”  was  launched t o  
di ffus e  pota to pr oduct i on t hroughout  t he  count ry;  “ Land Al i gnments ,”  des i gned t o  
level  and r ezone da maged f ie l ds ,  were  a lso p romot ed.  Thanks  to t hese  e ffor t s ,  f ood  
produc t i on r ecovered suff ic i en t l y to meet  domes t i c  dema nd i n 2005  (FAO/WF P 
2004) .  
In 1996 ,  in t he  power  sec tor,  t he  December  Ther ma l  Power  Plan t  in Na mpho and t he  
f i r s t  s tage o f  cons t ruct i on of  the  Kumga ngsan P ower  Plant  in Anb yon wer e  
compl eted.  The P ukchang Ther ma l  Power  St a t ion,  which had been forced t o cea se  
opera t ions  when the coa l  mi nes  were s ub merged,  r es umed wor k i n 1997 .  In  addi t i o n  
to t hese  la rge- sca le  power  s ta t ions ,  l oca l  governments  promoted t he cons t ruct i on o f  
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s ma l l  and medi um-s ized power  plants  i n 1998 . The t ota l  na t iona l  power  genera t ion  
was  1 .65  mi l l i on kW in 1997 ,  r ecover i ng to 3  mi l l ion kW in 1998 , 5 .03 mi l l i on kW i n  
2011 ,  and 7 .5  mi l l i on kW i n 2012;  the  la t ter  exceeded t he hi ghes t  pa s t  level .   
 
A ne w stage  of  econo mic  deve lopment  
Alt hough the r evi va l  of  food  and power  pr oduct ion  d id  not  seem s uff i c ient  to  mee t  
the  count r y’s  needs ,  i t  r es t ored the  a i l ing Nor th Korean s el f- r e l iant  economy.  In  
2011 , annua l  r evenue i n the  na t i ona l  budget  ros e  to i t s  pr evi ous  hi ghes t  l evel  o f  
1994 ,  whi l e  GDP sur passed t ha t  o f  1993 ,  the  previ ous  h ighes t  l evel .  P er  capi ta  GDP 
a lso exceeded 1993  levels  i n 2013 .   
In pa ra l le l  wi t h disa s ter  r ecover y,  the  leader shi p prepa red for  the  nex t  phase o f  
economi c devel opment .  The f i r s t  Five-Yea r  Pl an for  the  Devel opment  o f  Science and  
Technol ogy was  launched i n 1998 .  In  2000 ,  domes t i ca l ly pr oduce d  
comput er-numer ica l  cont rol  machi nes  bega n t o be i nt roduced a t  ma j or  machi ne- t ool  
fa ctor ies .  Dur i ng the la te  2000s ,  model  fa ctor ies  were  des i gna ted a s  
comput er- cont ro l led,  i nt egra ted pr oduct i on uni t s  in  t he  food,  pou l t ry,  and ma chi ner y  
indus t ry;  t hey were ex pected to  dr i ve pr oduct ion e ff ic i ency i n a l l  e conomi c sect or s .  
At  t ha t  t i me ,  t he  pr ocess  of  produci ng i ron wi t hout  coke was  ma de pract ica l ,  a  
cha nge t ha t  was  expect ed t o r educe t he  cos t  o f  pre- f er rous  pr oduct i on.   
We cannot  over l ook  t he C hi nese aux i l ia ry ro le  i n Nor t h Korea ’s  r ecovery process .  
Dur ing t his  t i me,  t he  P RC s t r engt hened i t s  economic presence and beca me known a s  
“a  wor ld produc t i on center”  (METI 2001 ,  27)  and la ter  a s “ the Wor ks hop of  t he  
Wor ld.”  Chi nes e cons umer  goods  a rr ived j us t  a s  DPRK l ight - indus t r y factor i es  cu t  
produc t i on or  c l osed down,  due t o a  la ck of  energy.  In 2003 ,  the  PRC gover nment  
deci ded t o pr ovi de grant  a i d wor th 24  mi l l i on dol la r s  to  bu i l d t he  Taea n  Fr iends hi p  
Gla ss  Fact ory;  cons t ruct i on began  i n 2004  a nd t he fact or y was  complet ed i n 2005 ,  
ma ki ng t he DPRK a  target  o f  C hi nes e inves t ment .  The f l ow of  C hi nes e di r ec t  
inves t ment  to t he  DPRK tota led 1 .12  mi l l i on dol la r s  in 2003 . In 2004 , i t  r ose  t o  
14 .13  mi l l i on do l la r s ;  in 2012 ,  i t  r eached  109 .46  mi l l i on dol lar s  (Minis t r y o f  
Commerce o f  P eople’s  Republ ic  of  C hi na  2006 ,  Minis t r y of  C ommerce o f  P eople’s  
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Republ i c  of  C hi na  2012) .   
The r egi me a ls o counted on a ss is tance from t he R uss ia n Federa t i on,  t he  s uccess or  t o  
the  Sovi et  Union.  The R uss ian gover nment  r eques t ed coopera t ion wi th t he  DPRK on  
expandi ng i t s  ra i lway net work and pi pel ines .  On Septemb er  17 ,  2012 ,  the  RF and  
DPRK s igned an agreement  t ha t  forgave 90  percent  o f  t he  DPRK's  11  b i l l ion dol la r  
deb t ,  a l l oca t i ng t he  r ema i ni ng 10  percent  t o the  j oi nt  proj ect  (Wall  Stree t  Journal .  
2012;  J os onj ungangt ongs in 2012) .  In Oct obe r  2014 , the  Russ ian pla n to cons t r uc t  
and moder nize  the  DPRK ra i lwa y,  known a s  “ Pobeda ,”  began.  
Al ongs i de q uant i ta t i ve  and te chnologi ca l  i mp rovements  i n  pr oduct i on,  pub l ic  levels  
of  cons umpt i on increa sed.  In t he  pa s t ,  the  pa r ty and gover nment  ha d t r ied t o increa se  
produc t i on whi le  curb ing cons umer  s pendi ng.  In the  21 s t  c ent ury,  fore ign capi ta l  was  
a l lowed t o f l ow i nt o sect or s  r e la ted t o per sona l  cons umpt i on.  In 2003 ,  genera l  
ma r kets  were  s et  up i n Pyongyang and ot her  la rge c i t i es .  I n 2008 ,  a  mobi l e  phone  
service  was  launched;  i n 2009 ,  fa s t - food r e s taurants  and s hops  opened  j oi nt l y i n  
Singapore and P yongyang.  In 2012 ,  the  Kwangb ok S hoppi ng C enter  opened,  wi t h  
inves t ment  from C hi na .  In 2013 ,  a  tax i  bus iness  was  es tab l i shed  t o s erve l oca l  
inhab i tants  i n P yongyang.  S ka t ing r i nks  and  swi mmi ng pools  were  cons t ructed i n  
Pyongyang and ot her  la rge c i t ies .   
A mechanis m was  es tab l i shed  t o enab le  increas ing  cons umpt i on  t o dr ive product i on  
in t he  ma nufact ur i ng sect or s .  A r evis i on o f  the  Enterpr i se  Law in 2014  empowere d  
a l l  s ta te-owned ent erpr i ses  t o i mpl ement  t hei r  own pr oduct i on plans ,  apa r t  f ro m 
s ta te  a ss ignments .  This  a l lowed fact or ies  and compa nies  t o ca rry out  product i o n  
act ivi t i es  tha t  di r ect l y r ef lec ted cons umer  needs .  The ex pans i on of  product i on i n th e  
indus t r ia l  sect or  woul d cont i nue unt i l  dema nds  were sa t i s f ied.  
 
Co nc l us io n 
Arguably,  t he  DPRK’s  sel f- s uppor t i ng s t r uc ture  beca me es tab l i s hed a round 1970 ,  
when s ocia l i s t  indus t r ia l iza t i on  was  achieved .  However,  i nherent  weaknesses  in  t he  
sel f- r e l iant  devel opment  s t r a tegy,  i ncl udi ng a  la ck of  forei gn cur r ency a nd  r i s i ng  
produc t i on cos ts ,  began t o ma ter ia l iz e  in the  for m of  outs tandi ng deb ts  and s hor tages  
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of  cons umer  goods  dur i ng the 1970s and 198 0s .  Na tura l  disa s ter s  in t he  mi d-1990s  
exacerba ted t he  need for  inves t ment  funds .   
I t  i s  notab le  tha t  the  sel f- s uppor t i ng economic s t ruct ure  per s i s t s ,  des pi te  food and  
power  shor tages .  E conomi c growt h,  led b y t he  newl y per mi t t ed des i r e  for  per sona l  
cons umpt i on,  s t r engt hens  t his  s t ruct ure .   
When pr oduct i on meets  cons umer  dema nd,  economic deve lopment  advances .  At  t hi s  
s tep,  producer s  mus t  cul t i va te  over sea s demand,  work t o r educe t he  cos t  o f  thei r  
produc ts ,  and r emove  t r ade ba r r ier s .  This  wi l l  be  a  ser i ous  cha l lenge  t o t he  DPRK’s  
sel f- s uppor t i ng economi c s t ruc ture ,  whi ch  t ends  t o i ncrea se  pr oduct i on cos ts  an d  
la cks  hard cur r ency.  F ut ure  predict ed economi c coopera t ion wi t h t he  Republ ic  o f  
Korea and J apan coul d in f l uence t he  DPR K to t urn i t s  se l f- s uff ic ient  economi c  
s t ruct ure  i nt o an open one.  
At  the  sa me t i me,  i f  e conomi c gr owt h dr iven by cons umpt i on fa i l s  for  any r ea son ,  
Nor th K orea  wi l l  keep i t s  ex is t i ng sel f- suppor t ing s t r uct ure .  The UN Secur i t y  
Counci l  adopted  Res ol ut i on 2371  on Augus t  5 ,  2017 ,  prohib i t i ng  new j oi nt  ven ture s  
wi t h the  DPRK and new inves t ments  in cur r ent  j oi nt  vent ures .  This  r esol ut i o n  
r es t r ic t s  Chi na  and R uss ia’s  economic act i vi t ies  in or  wi t h the  DPRK.  Al t hough the  
i mpact  of  th is  r es t r ic t i on was  no t  i mmedia te l y f e l t ,  i t  i s  ex pec ted t o pu t  t he  b rakes  
on cons umpt i on- led economic growt h i n fu ture ,  whi le  s us ta in ing t he  c l ose d  
economi c s t ruct ure  tha t  a l lows  t he DPRK  to s t r eng then i t s  a r ms  indus t r y and  
promot e t he  i ndependent  devel opment  o f  nucl ear  wea pons .  
 
Note  
1 .  Off ic ia l  s ta t i s t ics  have been compi l ed b y t he C ent r a l  Bureau of  Sta t i s t ics ,  DPRK.  
In the  pa s t ,  de ta i l s  were  pub l i s hed b y off i c i a l  media ,  such a s  t he  K orean Cent r a l  
News Agency;  however,  onl y fr agments  o f  i n for ma t i on were a nnounced a f ter  t he  la t e  
1960s .  The r ecent  o ff i c ia l  s ta t i s t ics  ment i oned i n t his  ar t ic l e  were  r epor t ed b y the  
DPRK delega t i on a t  the  Uni ted Na t ions  Devel opment  Pr ogra m (UNDP)  and  
communi ca ted  t o fore ign  j our na l i s t s  and  r esearcher s  t hrough t he  Academy of  Socia l  
Sciences ,  DPRK.  
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2 .  Al though commenta tor s  ha ve va r ious  opi ni ons  about  t he  number  of  peopl e  wh o  
s tarved t o dea th due t o fa mi ne dur i ng t he  mi d-1990s ,  Dr.  Moon ca lcula ted th e  
number  demographi ca l ly,  ba sed on f i gures  f rom a  cens us  conduct ed by t he  DPRK  
government ,  i n coopera t ion wi t h the  Uni t ed Na t ions  Agency (M oon H o I l .  2011) .  
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